I
Every historical epoch has a characteristic culture, cons·1stmg of its peculiar political, economic, and social institutions, its laws, moral standards, art, religion, and philosophy. A number of theories have been advanced -as to the nature of the determining factor or dominating influence which gives, to a culture its shape a·nd character. Marx has suggested ·that }this determining factor is economic in nature, Freud that. it is sexual. In my opinion it is something much broader and more complex, and therefore less easy to identify and define. I call this underlying, determining force a "tradition." A tradition, in this sense, is an attitude towards life, a way of looking at things, whi~h is almost instinctively and unconsciously adopted by the immense majority of those who live in the historic~} period . . What is meant by the tradition of an ·age can best be seen in examples from history. There is some such underlying influence behind every culture and civilization. The tradition. of the Graeco-Roman period might' be called the Greek aristocratic tradition. Among its characteristics was the . unquestioning acceptance of a realm of reality other than ·the physical, a realm whose authori.ty 'was absolute.-Above both gods and men Fate reigned, inexorably determining the course 6£ individual and social history. A second characteristi~ of this tradition was the recognition of certainmoral standards (the classical virtues), the violation of which led to disaster. T~is, in turn, involved a typically tragic view of life. It was under the influence of this tradition that Greek society took its shape and Greek art _and literature developed their form. Finally, the tradition was given rational expression and articulation in Greek philosophy, beginning with the Pythagoreans in th.e sixth century B.C. and culminating with Plato and
Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. The supra-physical realm is rationally articulated in terms of numbers, id~as, form; the _ classical virtues are rationally established; aristocratic society is proved to be the highest type. Thus the tradition becomes self-conscious and perfectly explicit.
In the meclieval period the prevailing tradition might be called the Catholic Christian tradition. Here again ·there is the unquestioning acceptance of the reality and absolute authority of the supra-physical, ' the validity of certain moral standards (the classical plus the theological), the superiority o'f a certain type of social organization. Again the tradition manifests itseli in a characteristic culture and is given rational expression in typical philosophies which culminate in the system of Thomas --Aquinas in the thirteenth century.
In the same way we can find a tradition behind· modern culture and philosophy. It manifests itself in the various cultural institutions and tendencies -of our age, and is articulated in various typical philosophies, culminating in Marxism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This tradition might be called the s'cientific tradition.
II
The scientific tradition took its rise in the sixteenth century, simultaneously with the emergence of the physical sciences in their modern dress. Francis Bacon attacked the old deductive method of acquiring knowledge, and insisted that empirical induction was the only valid method. Kepler added the significant point that the scientific method, which he elaborated on the basis of Bacon's work, could obviously be interested only in physical matters of fact accessible to observation. Science is only. inte~ested in measurable quantity; not in intangible quality. In other · words, Kepler was insisting that if science is to be true to its proper method and subject-. matter it must be materialistic.
Galilee revealed something else about science. I:le pointed out that it science deals only with observable matters of fact, it must assume that everything which happens is due to the operation of natural cause-s 'functioning mechanically. Anything which cannot b~ explained in this way must be ·ruled out of scientific consideration. In other words, if science is to be . true to its proper method and subject-matter it must be mechanisti~.-. Further, because of the great su. ccesses of the physical sciences in the sixteenth and seventeenth centur-ies in achieving knowledge of and control over the physical world, there grew up along with these sciences a belief in human progress. The optimism of the new natural sciences in · the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is reflected in the· works of Francis · Bac~n. He regarded his new scientific method of knowledge as the key ·which would uyield up their fortune to mankind upon -the emancipation and majority of their understanding: from which must necessarily follow ·an improvement of their estate and increase of their power over nature." ·Man, indeed, can gain "an empire over creation ... by the . .'. sciences."i
The rise of the physical sciences, with these characteristics," led to a general attitude towards life. which I call the scientific tradition, and which by. the seventeenth century; had become the prevailing influence in shaping modern culture. 2 ln this new tradition the characteristics of the physical sciences were. transformed into biases. The materialistic presupposi'tion became, in the scientific tradition, a materialistic bias, i.e. the tendency to assume that the physical is alone real. The mechanistic presupposition became, in the scientific tradition, a mechanistic bias, i.e. the tendency to assume that everything that happens, including what man does ' .and thin,ks, is. entirely due to natural, mechanical causes. The optimism of the physical sciences became, in the scientific tradition, an optimistic bias, i.e. the tendency to assume that science will inevitably achieve salvation for man.
The three characteristics of the scientific tradition, then, are its materialism, its mechanism, and its optimism, all operating as almost. unconscious biases underlying modern culture.
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In the next section an attempt will be made to show how these underlying assumptions in the modern tradition are made self-conscious and articulate in Marxism.
III
The three biases of the scientific tradition are transformed into dogmas in Marxis. m which, thereby, simply takes them to their logical conclusion and gives the whole tradition of the modern age its definitive articulation. The m~terialistic bias becomes the dogma of dialectical materialism; the mechanistic bias becomes the dogma of economic determinism; and the optimistic bias becomes the dogma of communist utopianism.
Before examining these Marxist doctrines it is necessary to defend the view that they are dogmas. Marx himself explicitly denies it, and claims that his goal is not absolute truth and absolute justic. e, but only beliefs that are more true and a society which is more just. Ma. rxism as it has developed, however, has become increasingly dogmatic. For instance, . the Communist Manifesto, written by Marx and Engels, is a model for the presentation of Q.ogma. Every proposition, wjth the exception of the last sentence, is in the pres~nt indicative and purports to be a statement of undeniable fact, a certain and final truth. Lenin, in "The Three Sources and Three Constituent ' Parts of Marxism," speaks of Marx's philosophy. as "all-powerful," "complete and symmetrical, offering an integrated view of the · world," "the only consistent philosophy," and nthatfinished philosophical materialism which has given humanity ... the greatest of all instruments of understanding." , He also points out that Marx and Engels "many times explained · the profound error of any departure from this foundation." 4 These quotations make it quite clear that Marxism claims to be the final absolute truth. The hypothetical empiricism of the physical sciences passes over into dogmatism.
This dogmatism is, of course, a departure from the sciehtific spirit. Nevertheless, it serves, in Marxism, to give a positive and emphatic expression to the characterist,ic biases of the scientific tradition.
The materialistic bias of the scientific tradition is transformed in Marxism into the basic dogma of dialectical materialism. The scientific stipulation that the proper field of scientific investigation is the physical, is turn~d into the dogma that the physical is alone real. Matter, which constit11tes the whole of reality, ·is regarded by Marx as "in a state. of develop'm.ent," ((evolution in the fullest;. deepest, and most universal aspect." 6 This notion, of course, is taken over froin Darwin's hypothesis of the evolution of organisms, and is applied, as a dogma, to teali_ty as a whole. Under the influence of Hegel, this universal evolution of matter is said to take place dialectically.
Turning to the next aspect of Marxism, it is not difficult to see that the doctrine of economic determinism is the dogmatic transformation of the mechanistic bias in the scientific tradition. This dogma is the 'Marxist explanation of the nature and history of human thought, society, and culture. The various forms which all these have taken are simply the reflections of dialectically evolving ·matter. Since they are human productions, they are reflections of what is material in man. What is material ]n man is his material needs and the way in which they are satisfied. The way in. which man satisfies his material needs constitutes the economic structure of his period. What men are, therefore, the way in which they think, the nature of their culture, the course of history, in any given epoch, all these are entirely determined by the economic system which prevails at the time. "What individuals· are, depends upon the material conditions of their production." 6 "In every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production ... form[s] the ba. sis upon which is ~uilt up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." 7 "Just exactly as man's knowledge reflects a nature existing independently of him-matter, that is, in a state of development-so also the social understanding of man (that is, his various views and teaching, philo_sophical, religious,_ political, etc.) reflects the economic structure of society." 8 The way in which man satisfies his material needs, i.e. the economic structure, mechanically determines the way in which he thinks and, in fact, determines the whole character of his culture, his social and political institutions, his ethical and legal norms, his art and literature, his philosophy and religi~n . . All these are simply by-products and reflections of economic forces. This is true not only of a culture in any given p, eriod· , but of the whole course of human history. · An economic system which ·satisfies the needs of one class always leaves unsatisfied the needs of other classes. ·one of the latter agitates for, and finally achieves, a change in the economic structure, and this in turn gives rise to a new culture and a new historical epoch. Thus· , economic forces are responsible not only for the character of each period but also for the change from one period to another, that is to say for the whole course of human history. . The dogma of economic determinism, when applied to cultural history, is elaborated ~n the doctrine of ideology, and when applied to social history, ·is developed in the doctrine of class conflict. The former doctrine states that since one class always benefits more than others .from the existing economic aqangements, that class . wants that economic system to be regarded as perm anent and unchangeable. And since the existing culture, with its typical values, reflects and justifies that system, the privileged class wants that culture and those ·values to be regarded as absolute and eternal. Thus, the prevailing culture, with its moral, political, intellectual, and religious norms, is always nothing more than an -ideology maintained in the interests of the privileged class and of the status quo.
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. The doctrine of class conflict states that an inevitable_ tension arises in every society owing to the fact that one class benefits most and the others less from the economic system. This gives rise to an historical dialectic which is just the reflection of the universal dialectic of matter.
In this historical dialectic the thesis is the privileged class, the antithesis is the exploited classes, and the synthesis is achieved when one of the latter -/ su ccessfully revolts and introduces a new economic system. This does not eliminate the class conflict, however, but simply means that a new class _ assumes the privileged position and begins to exploit the others, and the dialectic proceeds.
The doctrines of ideology and class conflict are meant to account for the nature of all human culture and for the whole course of history, and to .account for them in entirely naturalistic and deterministic terms. This is what is meant by saying that Marxist economic determinism is the dogmatic expression of the mechanistic bias .in the scientific tradition.
. The third characteristic of the scientific tradition is its optimistic bias. This bias is transformed, in Marxism, into the dogma of what may be called communist utopianism. Marxists, of course, indignantly repudiate the term "utopia-n.'' Its use, ·however, seems justified by their views concerning the inevitability and the nature of communism. According to ··this theory, the eventual .establishment of communist society throughout the world is guaranteed by the dialectic of history which, in turn, is rigorously-determined by the dialectical evolution of matter in general. The dogma of inevitable progress towards the finai goal of history could not · be more forcibly stated.
Just as in Darwin's theory the later products of evolution are regarded .as "higher" than the earlier, and the suggestion is that the process will finally produce the perfect organism, so. in Marxism it is assumed that the later societies are "higher, types of social ·organization than the earlier, and _it is dogmatically asserted that the process will finally result in the perfect ·society of communism._ The assumption is revealed in Lenin's statement that "out . of one set-up of. social life, another higher one develops." 10 The dogma is enunciated by Marx when he says (lthe class struggle leads necessarily to the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "this dictatorship is-but the transition to the abolition of all classes and to the creation of a society of the free and equal."
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In statements of this kind it is clearly seen how the optimistic bias of the-scientific tradition becomes the dogma of inevitable progress. History advances inexorably to its goat in accordance with the eternal laws -of the .dialectic. This is the background of Engel's final dogmatic assertion that the whole future of the process can be deduced "with the same certainty with which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced." 12 The-coming of the ideal society is just as certain as a mathematical deduction, i.e. absolutely certain.
The ideal society is, of cours,e, the communist society. In this society} alone of all societies, the class conflict will be absent. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the proletariat (the exploited class in our society) is "the immense majority," 1 a and therefore "cannot attain its emancipation ... without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, classdistinction and class-struggles."
14 And in the second place, the proletariat has ·i1o special interests, the satisfaction of which would result in the exploitation-of others. "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains., 10 Not only will there be no class conflict in the communist society, but there will be no state: government by force will be unnecessary. For "political power, properly so-called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another," 16 and since there will be no classes in the · communist society, political power will not so much be abolished as (in Engel's phrase) just "wither away."
It is only necessary to add that in the communist society,. according to Marxism, wealth will be distributed, not .in accordance with any base or utilitarian principle, but in accordance with the idealistic formula "from ·each according to his ability, to each according to his need." 17 To describe this vision of the summum bonum as utopian does not seem to be too much of an exaggeration. 18 The optimistic bias of the scientific tradition becomes the dogma of communist utopianism.
To sum up: the dogmas o(Marx.ism constitute a coherent, systematic, comprehensive, and extremely forceful articulation of the characteristic tendencies of the scientific tradition. Since the latter underlies the whole o"r modern life, it is not difficult to understand the attraction of the former for modern man. Without passing any judgments on the validity of the Marxist doctrines or on the value of the scientific tradition, I am simply contending that the former are the. logical culmination and expression of the latter. If it is true that the scientific tradition has been the prevailing influence in shaping modern culture, then Marxism is nothing but the natural end-result of the whole t~end of modern cultural history. · Aristotle and Aquinas gave to the Greek.aristocratic and to the Catholic Christian traditions respectively their final definitive formulations. It is for this reason that, in retrospect, it is customary to regard ·Aristotle and Aquinas as great conservatives, in the sense that,· by establishing the characteristic traditions of their respective periods, they hoped to preserve -those traditions. It is my ·contention that Marx similarly will, in retrospect, come to be regarded as a conservative ·in the same sense, namely that, .by seeking to ·est'ablish .the scientific tradition au" a rational basis; he hoped to preserve that tradition.
17Jbid., 7 (Mnrx).
18J ust as Marx failed to apply the doctrine of ideology (which is supposed to be uni~ versally applicable).to his own philosophy, so he failed to apply the doctrine of the dialectic of history (which is also supposed to be universally applicable) to his communist society. But even if the next stage of society were to be communism, there could be no empirical justification for the assertion that the social dialectic would then come to an end. It would be much more realistic to expect this social synthesis, like all the others, to become a thesis in a new dialectical tension. But Marx here ceases to be empirical and realistic and ~ecomes dogmatic and utopian.
